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ARGUMENT
I.

THE DECISION OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW IS CONTRARY TO LAW,
NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, AND ARBITRARY
AND CAPRICIOUS
A.

EVENTS WHICH OCCURRED SUBSEQUENT TO PETITIONER'S BASE
PERIOD AND APPLICATION FOR BENEFITS CANNOT BE USED TO
DENY BENEFITS TO PETITIONER

Respondent has argued that INS1 actions to deport
Petitioner disqualified Petitioner for unemployment benefits.
Importantly for the Petitioner, INS took no action to deport
him or act upon his application for immigrant status at any
relevant time, either during Petitioner's base period (calendar
year 1984) or before Petitioner's application for benefits
(January 6, 1985).

The factual matters alleged by Respondent

which occurred subsequent to Petitioner's filing of his claim
are irrelevant; they cannot be used to deny benefits to
Petitioner.

Petitioner was eligible for unemployment benefits

under Utah Code Ann. §35-4-5(k) at all relevant points in time.
The after-the-fact information which Respondent presents is
immaterial to a decision which should have been made on
Petitioner's base period.
Events subsequent to the time Petitioner applied for
benefits do not affect the decision of this Court.

As defined

in Holley v. Lavine, 553 F.2d 845 (2nd Cir. 1977), an
individual may be "permanently residing in the United States"
even though his stay here "may be dissolved eventually at the
instance either of the United States or of the individual."
553 F.2d at 850.

In this case, Petitioner is now a permanent

resident of the United States.

Yet, even if action taken by

INS subsequent to Petitioner's application for unemployment

benefits eventually were to result in the dissolution of
Petitioner's permanent residence in this country under color of
law, that dissolution would not occur without a determination of
his immigration status by an immigration judge.
This Court's decision in Antillon v. Dept. of Employment
Security, 688 P.2d 455 (Utah 1984) buttresses Petitioner's
argument that no action to remove him from the United States
could occur prior to an adjudication of his case by an
immigration judge.

Accordingly, at all relevant times

Petitioner was eligible to receive unemployment benefits as an
alien "permanently residing in the United states under color of
law11, and the facts of his case are indistinguishable from the
facts which this Court reviewed in Antillon.
B,

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS ARE GUARANTEED
IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS

Respondent casts aspersions on Petitioner for requesting
voluntary departure in lieu of deportation once his request for
suspension of deportation was denied.

It cannot be stressed

too much or repeated too often that Petitioner's deportation
hearings came after his base period and application for
unemployment benefits.

It is a standard practice for

immigration attorneys, when requesting suspension of
deportation, to request voluntary departure in the alternative.
A request for voluntary departure is not a concession of
deportability.

8 C.F.R. §242.17(e).

The immigration judge

granted Petitioner the right to voluntary departure.
Petitioner went to Mexico for a few months, adjusted his status
and that of his family to that of permanent U.S. residents, and
-
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returned to Payson, Utah, where he and his family had
previously purchased a house and currently reside.
In any case where an alien requests suspension of
deportation, deportation does not take place before a final
decision is entered by an immigration judge,
and 243,2; see also (R. 0131),

8 C.F.R. §§243.1

Just as the arrest of a suspect

is not tantamount to an adjudication of guilt, the initiation
of deportation proceedings against an alien already in this
country is not tantamount to a finding of deportability.
Rather,
an alien within the United States, unlike
one applying for entry at the border, is
entitled to the full benefits of
procedural due process under the aegis of
the Fifth Amendment, Consequently,
expulsion can be ordered only in
accordance with law and after a fair
hearing.
Gordon and Rosenfield Immigration Law and Procedure §5,5
(1986), citing The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
The requirements of fair play and fair dealing embodied in the
notion of due process are codified in Section 242(b) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC §1252(b) (1983).
Therefore, the veracity of the order to show cause that INS
brings against an alien will not be determined prior to an
adjudication of the alien's case by an immigration judge,
C.

THE RELEVANT FACTS OF THE CASE ARE INDISTINGUISHABLE
FROM THOSE OF ANTILLON

Respondent has asserted that Petitioner did not contact
INS voluntarily.

Respondent points to no evidence to refute

-
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Petitionees testimony that he did so through his attorney in
1981 (R. 0121).

Petitioner's testimony and the copies of the

letter and INS Form G-28 (R. 0185, 86) sent by his lawyer to
INS constitute the only evidence on this issue.
Respondent has claimed summarily that the record
demonstrates that the facts of Petitioner's case are
distinguishable from those of Antillon.

In fact, the record

shows that, as in Antillon, the INS knew that Petitioner was in
the United States (since he was under docket control), knew
where Petitioner was living from documents filed with INS
containing his address, and took no action to deport Petitioner
or act on his application for immigrant status at any relevant
time.
D.

"LEGAL AVAILABILITY" CANNOT BE READ INTO
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §35-4-4(C)

In Antillon, 688 P.2d at 457, this Court stated that the
eligibility of aliens for unemployment benefits is governed by
Utah Code Ann. §35-4-5(k) (1953 as amended).

. Utah Code Ann.

§35-4-4(c), which Respondent commends to this Court's
attention, requires that claimants of unemployment benefits be
available for and actively seeking work during each week for
which they claim unemployment benefits.
legal availability in the statute.

There is no mention of

Nor is there any indication

in the record that the legislature intended legal availability
to be a condition to be satisfied by aliens "permanently
residing in the United States under color of law" within the
ambit of §35-4-5(k).

-
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Instead, Respondent attempts to read legal availability
into §35-4-4(c).

In Antillon, Respondent argued unsuccessfully

that aliens must meet a requirement of legal availability in
order to receive unemployment benefits-

Antillon, Defendant's

Brief at 10. Having lost the argument in Antillon, Respondent
raises the legal availability issue again in the case at bar,
this time in the guise of §35-4-4(c).

The argument carries no

more weight today than it did in Antillon.

Legal availability

is simply a non-issue in this case.
The Antillon Court noted that:
(t)he test in this case is not whether
Antillon initially entered this country
illegally or whether he was legally
entitled to work, but whether he was here
under color of law at the time he applied
for benefits.
688 P.2d at 458. Respondent is somewhat disingenuous in
suggesting that legal availability was not an issue in
Antillon.

In Antillon, legal availability was not the test; it

certainly was an issue, one which the Respondent itself raised
and did not prevail upon.

Under the authority of Antillon,

legal availability is not the test in this case, and Respondent
cannot read legal availability into Utah Code Ann. §35-4-4(c).
E.

AT ALL RELEVANT TIMES, PETITIONER WAS PERMANENTLY
RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES

Respondent has cited Sudomir v. McMahon, 767 F.2d 1456
(9th Cir. 1985), a case which indicated that an alien would not
be considered to be permanently residing in this country unless

-
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INS had specifically authorized that alien for permanent
residence•

However, under Utahfs statutory scheme there is a

provision separate from the color of law provision that
provides for those people who have been legally admitted by INS
to reside and work in the United States.

The color of law

provision is separate and distinct from the provision dealing
with lawfully admitted aliens:
(k)(l) For any week in which the benefits
are based upon services performed by an
alien, unless the alien is an individual
who has been lawfully admitted for
permanent residence at the time the
services were performed, was lawfully
present for purposes of performing the
services or, was permanently residing in
the United States under color of law at
the time the services were performed...
Utah Code Ann. §35-4-5(k)(emphasis added)
Permanent residence is a matter of intent.

The indicia

for all relevant times show that Petitioner's intent has never
been other than to reside in the United States permanently.

He

purchased a house, paid Utah taxes, possessed a Utah driver^s
license, and otherwise showed that his intent was to
permanently reside in the United States.

Prior to oral

argument, Petitioner will submit affidavits, with attachments,
showing that he was a permanent resident at all relevant times.

II.

ANTILLON IS CONTROLLING
A.

THE DISCUSSION IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
SUPPORTS THE DECISION IN ANTILLON

Respondent has marshalled the language of the
congressional debate surrounding the adoption of amendments to

-
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the federal unemployment statute.

Nevertheless, the

legislative history does not affect the decision in Antillon or
compel a decision contrary to Antillon in the case at bar.

As

noted in Respondent's Brief at 18, the Sisk Amendment provided:
(14) compensation shall not be payable on
the basis of services performed by an
alien who was not lawfully admitted to
the United States;
This provision does not include the category of aliens who are
"permanently residing in the United States under color of law."
Antillon determined that Congress created three exceptions
to the general rule denying benefits.

The Sisk Amendment was

modified to reflect three exceptions to those aliens "not
lawfully admitted to the United States;": The semicolon after
this phrase strengthens Antillon's interpretation of
§35-4-5(k), as it suggests that exceptions will follow.

The

statutory construction applied by this Court in Antillon is
bolstered by the Congressional Record debates relied on by
Respondent.
The Antillon opinion went on to find that Antillon was a
member of one of the excepted class of aliens, that class
"permanently residing in the United States under color of law."
Petitioner likewise is a member of the same class of aliens.
Adoption of the position urged by Respondent would have the
effect of judicially implementing the language of the Sisk
Amendment without the subsequent modifications which provided
three exceptions to the general rule.

-
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B.

ANTILLON'S COLOR OF LAW ANALYSIS
IS STILL VALID

Antillon grounded its analysis of the term "under color of
law,f in the definition applied by the Second Circuit in Hoi ley
v. Layine, 553 F.2d 845 (2nd Cir. 1977), cert, denied sub nom
Shang v. Hoiley, 435 U.S. 947 (1978).
appropriate.

That analysis is still

Holley continues to be the leading case on this

issue and has been cited with approval throughout the country.
In addition to this Court in Antillon, there are other
state courts which have not required affirmative acts or policy
of the INS in upholding or granting benefits to claimants.

In

these cases courts have found "color of law" when the INS had
notice of an alienfs presence but had taken no steps to deport
that alien.

See Rubio y. Employment Division, 674 P.2d 120

(Or. App. 1984); Cruz y. Commissioner of Public Welfare, 395
Mass. 107, 478 N.E.2d 1262 (1985); St^ Francis Hospital y.
D'elia, 71 A.D. 2d 110, 422 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1979).
Respondent calls to this Court's attention a few federal
cases which construe the term "under color of law", as well as
a program letter which offers a U.S. Department of Labor
interpretation of "color of law" for Federal Unemployment
Tax Act (FUTA) purposes. However:
Because of the nature of the relationship
between FUTA and state law, federal
interpretations of FUTA have a limited
effect. The only binding federal
decision would be a United States Supreme
Court decision on the interpretation or
constitutionality of the Federal law.
Lower federal decisions does (sic) not
relieve this court of the responsibility

-
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to interpret the statutory test under
state law. "(A) state supreme court does
have to reach a final decision as to the
state law that seeks to take advantage of
the disputed federal statute." (cite
omitted)
Gillar v. Employment Division, 717 P.2d 131, 135 n. 6 (Or.
1986).

It is emphatically the place of the state Supreme Court

to declare what the state law is, as this Court did in
Antillon.

Its decision in Antillon is controlling over

Respondent.

Respondent is obliged to obey Utah state law, and

show deference to this Court's interpretation of the law.
C.

RESPONDENT'S POSITION FAILS TO SATISFY THIS
COURT'S STANDARD OF REVIEW

As Respondent recites, the standard of review which this
Court has adopted when reviewing the Commission's
interpretation of general questions of law is a
"correction-of-error" standard.

Salt Lake City Corporation v.

Department of Employment Security, 657 P.2d 1312 (Utah 1982);
Department of Administrative Services v. Public Service
Commission, 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983);

McPhie v. Industrial

Commission, 567 P.2d 153 (Utah 1977).

The Commission's

construction of a statute remains subject to judicial review
for consistency with the governing legislation and prior
decisions of the court.

Bayle v. Board of Review, 700 P.2d

1135 (Utah 1985).
Under this standard of review, the Board of Review plainly
abused its authority through its non-acquiescence in the
Antillon decision and its substitution of its own
interpretation of §35-4-5(k) for that of the Court.

-
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Respondent's construction of the statute is patently
inconsistent with the Antillon opinion, and should be rejected.
D.

PETITIONER WAS ENTITLED TO BENEFITS

The action of the Board of Review was directly opposed to
Utah state law as enunciated in Antillon.

Petitioner was

entitled to unemployment benefits as an alien "permanently
residing in the United States under color of law."

The facts

of this case cannot be distinguished from the facts in Antillon
for the relevant times in questions.

Once Petitioner made

himself and his presence known to INS officials, he was
residing in this country under color of law.

Action taken by

INS after the time that Petitioner applied for benefits does
not retroactively negate Petitioner's presence under color of
law.
Petitioner was in the United States under color of law at
all relevant times to his claim for unemployment benefits.

He

is not asking for welfare, but for the benefits he worked for,
from the benefit pool his employer paid into during his base
period.

An award of benefits to the Petitioner will not open

the floodgates to a tide of illegal immigrants; the standard
will remain narrowed to aliens permanently residing in the
United States under color of law.

An award of benefits will be

consistent with the fair dealing implicit in the idea of due
process.

Petitioner has worked and participated in paying into

the unemployment insurance system.
deal with his claim.

§35-4-5(k) is in place to

The precedent of Antillon is in place to

ensure his right to seek benefits.

-

Justice demands that
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Petitioner be awarded the benefits for which he has worked, and
for which he was eligible at the time of his application.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Board of
Review should be reversed and unemployment benefits should be
awarded to the Petitioner.
DATED this 14th day of July, 1986.
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
Attorneys for Petitioner

/jAisn-t. fCcfJL
BY:

T:

WAINE RICHES

BRUCE PLENK
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.^Ko»iucnt snail oe re„v «/*«* picas over tne general
quired to state then and there whethpublic.
(b) Pleading by respondent The spe- er he desires a continuance for either
cial inquiry officer shall require the of these reasons. Thereafter, the provisions of paragraph (b) of this section
respondent to plead to the order to shall
apply to the additional factual
show cause by stating whether he allegations
and lodged charges.
admits or denies the factual allegations and his deportability under the C27 FR 9646, Sept. 29, 1962, as amended at
charges contained therein. If the re- 29 PR 13243, Sept. 24, 1964; 32 FR 9632,
spondent admits the factual allega- July 4, 1967; 44 FR 4654, Jan. 23. 19793
tions and admits his deportability
under the charges and the special in- § 242.17 Ancillary matters, applications.
quiry officer is satisfied that no issues
(a) Creation of the status of an alien
of law or fact remain, the special in- lawfully admitted for permanent resiquiry officer may determine that de- dence. The respondent may apply to
portability as charged has been estab- the special inquiry officer for suspenlished by the admissions of the re- sion of deportation under section
spondent. The special inquiry officer 244(a) of the Act, for adjustment of
shall not accept an admission of de- status under section 245 of the Act, or
portability from an unrepresented re- under section 1 of the Act of Novemspondent who is incompetent or under ber 2, 1966, or under section 101 or 104
age 16 and is not accompanied by a of the Act of October 28, 1977, or for
guardian, relative, or friend; nor from creation of a record of lawful admisin officer of an institution In which a sion for permanent residence under
respondent is an inmate or patient. section 214(d) or 249 of the Act; such
IVhen, pursuant to this paragraph, the application shall be subject to the reipecial inquiry officer may not accept quirements contained in Parts 244,
m admission of deportability, he shall 245, and 249 of this chapter. In conlirect a hearing on the issues,
junction with such applications, if the
(c) Issues of deportability. When de« respondent
is inadmissible under any
>ortability is not determined under
provision
of
section 212(a) of the Act
he provisions of paragraph (b) of this
ection, the special inquiry officer and believes he meets the eligibility
hall request the assignment of a trial requirements for a waiver of the
ttorney, and shall receive evidence as ground of inadmissibility, he may
> any unresolved issues, except that apply to the special inquiry officer for
0 further evidence need be received such waiver. The special inquiry offi» to any facts admitted during the cer shall inform the respondent of his
leading.
apparent eligibility to apply for any of
(d) Additional charges. A trial attor- the benefits enumerated in this parajy who has been assigned to a case graph and shall afford him an opporay at any time during a hearing tunity to make application therefor
dge additional charges of deportabil- during the hearing. In exercising disrt including factual allegations cretionary power when considering an
ainst the respondent. The additional application under this paragraph, the
stual allegations and charges shall special inquiry officer may consider
submitted in writing and entered as and base his decision on information
exhibit in the record. The special not contained in the record and not
juiry officer shall read the addition- made available for inspection by the
factual allegations and charges to respondent, provided the Commission5 respondent and explain them to er has determined that such informan in nontechnical language. The tion is relevant and is classified under
cial inquiry officer shall advise the Executive Order No. 12356 (47 FR
pondent if he is not represented by 14874; April 6, 1982) as requiring pronsel that he may be so represented tection from unauthorized disclosure
1 also that he may have a reasona- in the interest of national security.
time within which to meet the ad- Whenever he believes he can do so
consistently with safeguarding both

Exhibit 4 (pcige 1)

special inquiry officer should inform
the respondent of the general nature
of the information in order that the
respondent may have an opportunity
to offer opposing evidence. A decision
based in whole or in part on such classified information shall state that the
information is material to the decision.
(b) Voluntary departure. The respondent may apply to the special inquiry officer for voluntary departure
in lieu of deportation pursuant to section 244(e) of the Act and Part 244 of
this chapter.
(c) Temporary withholding of deportation. The special inquiry officer
shall notify the respondent that if he
is finally ordered deported his deportation will in the first instance be directed pursuant to section 243(a) of
the Act to the country designated by
him and shall afford the respondent
an opportunity then and there to
make such designation. The special inquiry officer shall then specify and
state for the record the country, or
countries in the alternate, to which respondent's deportation will be directed
pursuant to section 243(a) of the Act if
the country of his designation will not
accept him into its territory, or fails to
furnish timely notice of acceptance, or
the respondent declines to designate a
country. The respondent shall be advised that pursuant to section 243(h)
of the Act he may apply for temporary withholding of deporation to the
country or countries specified by the
special inquiry officer and may be
granted not more than ten days in
which to submit his application. The
application shall consist of respondent's statement setting forth the reasons in support of his request. The respondent shall be examined under
oath on his application and may present such pertinent evidence or information as he has readily available.
The respondent has the burden of satisfying the special inquiry officer that
he would be subject to persecution on
account of race, religion, or political
opinion as claimed. The trial attorney
may also present evidence or information for the record, and he may submit
information not of record to be considered by the special inquiry officer pro-

or the Board has determined that
such information is relevant and is
classified under Executive Order No.
12356 (47 FR 14874; April 6, 1982) as
requiring protection from unauthorized disclosure in the interest of national security. When the special inquiry officer receives such non-record
information he shall inform the respondent thereof and shall also inform
him whether it concerns conditions*
generally in a specified country or the
respondent himself. Whenever he believes he can do so consistently with
safeguarding both the information
and its source, the special inquiry officer should state more specifically the
general nature of the information in
order that the respondent may have
an opportunity to offer opposing evidence. A decision based in whole or in
part on such classified information
shall state that such information is
material to the decision.
(d) Application for relief under section 241(f). The respondent may apply
to the immigration judge for relief
from deportation under section 241(f)
of the Act.
(e) General An application under
this section shall be made only during
the hearing and shall not be held to
constitute a concession of alienage or
deportability in any case in which the
respondent does not admit his alienage or deportability. The respondent
shall have the burden of establishing
that he is eligible for any requested
benefit or privilege and that it should
be granted in the exercise of discretion. The respondent shall not be required to pay a fee on more than one
application within paragraphs (a) and
(c) of this section, provided that the
minimum fee imposed when more
than one application is made shall be
determined by the cost of the applies
tion with the highest fee. Nothir
contained herein is intended to fort
close the respondent from applying
for any benefit or privilege which he
believes himself eligible to receive in
proceedings under this part.
(Title I of Pub. L. 95-145 enacted Oct. 28,
1977 (91 Stat. 1223). sec. 103 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1103).
Interpret or apply sees. 101, 212, 242 and 245
(8 U.S.C. 1101, 1182, 1252 and 1255); sees.
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\B1 243—DEPORTATION OF ALIENS
IN THE UNITED STATES
!C.

Z.l Pinal order of deportation.
i3.2 Warrant of deportation.
13.3 Expulsion.
13.4 Stay of deportation.
13.5 Self-deportation.
13.6 Notice to transportation line.
13.7 Special care and attention for aliens.
13.8 Imposition of sanctions.
AUTHORITY: Sees. 103. 242. 243. 66 Stat.
73, 208. as amended 212; 8 U.S.C. 1103.
252. 1253.
SOURCE: 26 FR 12113. Dec. 19. 1961. unless
therwise noted.
243.1 Final order of deportation.
Except as otherwise required by secion 242(c) of the Act for t h e specific
mrposes of that section, an order of
leportation. including an alternate
>rder of deportation coupled with an
>rder of voluntary departure, made by
,he special inquiry officer in proceedngs under Part 242 of this chapter
shall become final upon dismissal of
m appeal by the Board of Immigration Appeals, upon waiver of appeal,
ar upon expiration of the time allotted
for an appeal when no appeal is taken;
or. if such an order is issued by the
Board or approved by the Board upon
certification, it shall be final as of the
date of the Board's decision.
§ 243.2 Warrant of deportation.
A warrant of deportation based upon
the final administrative order of deportation in the alien's case shall be
issued by a district director. T h e district director shall exercise t h e authority contained in section 243 of the
Act to determine at whose expense the
alien shall be deported and whether
his mental or physical condition requires personal care and attendance
en route to his destination.
§ 243.3 Expulsion.
Once an order of deportation becomes final, an alien, not in the physical custody of the Service, shall be
given not less than 72 hours advance
notice in writing of the time and place
of his surrender for deportation. If the
alien fails to surrender as directed, he
shall be deported without further
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notice when located, w n e u un ancn is
directed to surrender for deportation,
he shall do so notwithstanding the
filing of an application for a stay of
deportation unless he has been informed prior to the surrender date
that a stay has been granted. The advance notice requirement above does
not preclude taking an alien into custody at any time, including any time
within the 72 hour period, if his being
at large constitutes a danger to public
safety or security, or the district director has reason to believe the alien is
likely to abscond, or if information is
received that the alien is likely to abscond. However, in such an instance,
the alien's deportation shall not be effected prior to the expiration of 72
hours from the time of apprehension
or of the 72 hour notice period, whichever is less. An alien shall be taken
into custody prior to the time specified in the surrender notice only pursuant to an order by an official empowered under § 242.2(a) of this chapter to issue warrants of arrest.
[41 FR 38758. Sept. 13, 19761
§ 243.4 Stay of deportation.
Any request of an alien under a final
administrative order of deportation
for a stay of deportation, except a request for withholding of deportation
pursuant to section 243(h) of the Act,
shall be filed on Form 1-246 with the
district director having jurisdiction
over the place where the alien is at
the time of filing. The district director, in his discretion, may grant a stay
of deportation for such time and
under such conditions as he may deem
appropriate. Written notice of the disposition of the alien's request shall be
served upon him and any notice of
denial shall include specific reasons
therefor; however, neither the making
of the request nor the failure to receive notice of disposition of the request shall relieve the alien from strict
compliance with any
outstanding
notice to surrender for deportation.
Denial by the district director of a request for a stay is not appealable but
such denial shall not preclude the
Board from granting a stay in connection with a motion to reopen or a
motion to reconsider as provided in
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^. preclude t h e special inquiry officer, tn
his discretion, from granting a stay in
connection with, and pending his determination of, a motion to reopen or
a motion to reconsider a case falling
within his jurisdiction pursuant to
§ 242.22 of this chapter, and also pending an appeal from such determination.
[40 FR 50702. Oct. 31. 19751
§ 243.5 Self-deportation.
A district director may permit an
alien ordered deported to depart at his
own expense to a destination of his
own choice. Any alien who has departed from t h e United States while an
order of deportation is outstanding
shall be considered to have been deported in pursuance of law, except
that an alien who departed before the
expiration of the voluntary departure
time granted in connection with an alternate order of deportation shall not
be considered to have been so deported.
[29 FR 6485, May 19, 19641

shall at its own expense forward t h e
alien from the foreign port of disembarkation to the final destination
specified on Form 1-287. T h e special
care and attention shall be continued
to such final destination, except when
the foreign public officers decline to
allow such attendant to proceed and
themselves take charge of the alien, in
which case this fact shall be recorded
by the transportation line on the reverse of Form I-287B. If the transportation line fails, refuses, or neglects to
provide the necessary special care and
attention or comply with the direc
tions of Form 1-287, the district direc
tor shall thereafter and without notict
employ suitable persons, at t h e ex
pense of the transportation line, an<
effect such deportation.

§ 243.8 Imposition of sanctions.
T h e provisions of section 243(g) c
t h e Act have been applied to residenl
of the Union of Soviet Socialist R
publics, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, ar
Cuba. These provisions do not apply 1
an alien who is residing in Estoni
Latvia, or Lithuania who is not a n
§ 243.6 Notice to transportation line.
When a transportation line is re- tional, citizen, or subject of the Uni<
sponsible for t h e expenses of an alien's of Soviet Socialist Republics. The
deportation, notification shall be made provisons also do not apply to an all
to such line on Form 1-284, when ap- who is residing in Cuba and can
plicable, and Form 1-288. If special classified as an immediate relative
care and attention is required, notifi- defined in section 201(b) or a retui
cation to this effect shall be placed on ing resident as defined in secti
101(a)(27)(A). The sanctions impos
Form 1-288.
on residents of the Union of Soviet!
§ 243.7 Special care and attention for cialist Republics, Czechoslovakia, s
aliens.
Hungary pursuant to section 243
W h e n a transportation line is re- may be waived in an individual c
sponsible for the expenses of an alien's for the beneficiary of a petition
deportation, t h e alien shall be deliv- corded a status under section 20Kb
ered to the master, commanding offi- section 203(a) of the Act. The SJ
cer, or the officer in charge of the tions upon the USSR, Czechoslovs
vessel or aircraft on which the alien and Hungary may be waived upon
will be deported, who shall be given individual request by the Departir
Forms 1-287, I-287A, and I-287B. T h e of State in behalf of a visa applic
reverse of Form I-287A shall be signed Upon approval of a visa petitior
by the officer of the vessel or aircraft upon an individual request by the
to whom the alien has been delivered partment of State in behalf of a
and immediately returned to the imapplicant, the district director s
migration officer effecting delivery. determine whether sanctions sha!
Form I-287B shall be retained by the waived. However, the regional com
receiving officer and subsequently
sioner or the Deputy Commissic
filled out by the agents or persons may direct that any case or chit
therein designated and returned by
IP'.*
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